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Security Council mandates and the use of lethal Force by Peacekeepers:  
What Place for the Laws of War?  
 
Nigel D. White 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the turn of the 21st century, peacekeepers have been under pressure to protect civilians 
and to protect the peace process. Peacekeepers have been criticised for being inactive in the 
face of violence when the mandates given to them by the Security Council clearly enable 
them, arguably require them, to use necessary measures against those who would undermine 
the peace or threaten civilians.1 
 
The chapter ZLOOH[SORUHWKHJDSEHWZHHQWKH6HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶VPDQGDWHDQGWKHXVHRIOHWKDO
weapons by peacekeepers and its implications for the law applicable to the use of force by 
peacekeepers. The argument is that the more coercive the mandate becomes, the more it might 
be expected that peacekeepers use force in accordance with the laws of war. However, the 
reality is that, unless they (exceptionally) become combatants in an armed conflict, they 
remain bound by human rights law, specifically, to respect the right to life. The question then 
becomes whether the human rights legal framework is sufficient to allow peacekeepers to 
carry out their mandate or whether it is possible to identify a new legal framework as part of 
an emerging jus post bellum? 
 
The focus of the chapter is on the military component of peace operations acting under the 
mandate, command and control of the United Nations (UN) - the blue helmets; although 
reference is also made to the police element of UN peace operations. The chapter will trace 
the development of peace operations from their inception as limited military forces in the 
                                                          
1
 Especially in relation to the conflict in Darfur; IRU H[DPSOH $ GH :DDO µ'DUIXU DQG WKH )DLOXUH RI WKH
5HVSRQVLELOLW\ WR 3URWHFW¶, 83 International Affairs (2009)  &* %DGHVFX DQG / %HUJKROP µ7KH
5HVSRQVLELOLW\WR3URWHFWDQGWKH&RQIOLFWLQ'DUIXU7KH%LJ/HW'RZQ¶, 40 Security Dialogue (2009) 287. 
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1950s to their modern form, which is not only multifaceted but appears, from the mandates 
given by the Security Council to such operations over the last decade, to be more belligerent 
than their predecessors.  
 
Peacekeepers, even at their inception, have been given functions that are less than those of 
combat yet more than those of law enforcement, but it is argued that this does not somehow 
place them in a legal no-PDQ¶VODQG. Instead, it is asserted that, despite increasingly coercive 
Security Council mandates, peacekeepers remain subject to international human rights law 
standards when using weapons and, only exceptionally, when actively engaged as combatants 
within an armed conflict situation, to international humanitarian law (IHL) standards ± where 
the right to life is qualified by those laws of war that alloZµHQHP\¶FRPEDWDQWVWREHHQJDJHG
with lethal force.2 There is, as yet, no intermediate position that might emerge as part of a 
developing jus post bellum regime. 
 
Support for this position is drawn from two resources that feature in this book ± the 
perspectives of the military lawyer and of Peter Rowe himself. First of all, support for the 
position adopted in this paper is drawn from the argument of Rob McLaughlin of the Royal 
Australian Navy, who reasoned that there are only two legitimate paradigms for multinational 
peace operations acting under a Chapter VII mandate, one of armed conflict and another of 
law enforcement, and that the default position is that of law enforcement governed by human 
rights law.3 This chapter adopts a similar position, although it approaches the subject through 
considering the nature, doctrine and practice of UN peacekeeping operations, and argues that 
the concept of self-defence, as developed by that doctrine and practice, is both wide enough to 
allow peacekeepers to perform their functions and specific enough to remain compliant with 
human rights law. 
 
                                                          
2
 P. Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 135: The 
µlex specialis (international humanitarian law) permits a lawful combatant to kill another lawful combatant 
providing that the means of doing so DUHQRWWKHPVHOYHVSURKLELWHGXQGHUWKDWODZ¶6HHIXUWKHU, the 
International Court of Justice in  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996,  240 at 
SDUDµ7KHSURWHFWLRQRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RYHQDQWRI&LYLODQG3ROLWLFDORights does not cease in times of 
war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a 
time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right 
not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of 
life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict which is dHVLJQHGWRUHJXODWHWKHFRQGXFWRIKRVWLOLWLHV¶ 
3
 50F/DXJKOLQ µ7KH/HJDO5HJLPH$SSOLFDEOH WR WKH8VHRI/HWKDO)RUFH:KHQ2SHUDWLQJXQGHUD8QLWHG
Nations Security Council Chapter VII Mandate Authorising All Necessary Means¶ 12 JCSL (2007) 389-417.   
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Further support is drawn from Peter Rowe, who convincingly reasoned that there are many 
operational, as well as legal, reasons why military contingents contributing to peacekeeping 
forces will not be combatants in an armed conflict, not least that it is very unlikely that 
µSDUWLFLSDWLQJVWDWHVZLOOZLVKWRDFFHSWWKDWWKH\DUHHQJDJed in an armed conflict and thereby 
lose¶ their legal protection µeven where their national contingents come under intense fire and 
DQXPEHUDUHNLOOHGRUZRXQGHG¶4 For Rowe, the legal framework governing the use of lethal 
force by SHDFHNHHSHUVZLOOEHµFRPSiled from the national, military law and any human rights 
REOLJDWLRQV¶RIWKH7roop Contributing Nations.5 
 
 
The nature and development of peacekeeping 
 
Peacekeeping was essentially a development of the stifling and ubiquitous effects of the Cold 
War and as such, was not envisaged in the UN Charter. Nevertheless, it was vital in securing 
the basic goal of the UN, namely a minimum level of peace and security in trouble spots 
around the world. This initially resulted in very small UN unarmed observer forces in colonial 
and post-colonial conflict zones in Indonesia, Kashmir, and Palestine in the late 1940s, 
dispatched to provide the Security Council with a reliable account of the facts. This led, in 
1956, to a fully-fledged, lightly armed, but several thousand-strong, force (the UN Emergency 
Force ± UNEF I) deployed to secure the peace by acting as a buffer between formerly hostile 
nations following the British/French/Israeli intervention in Suez.  
 
Although new in its day, WKLVQRZµWUDGLWLRQDO¶W\SHRISHDFHNHHSLQJ, embodied in UNEF I, 
reflected classical principles of international law in that it was based on the consent of the 
host State or States and, even though it appeared to constitute military intervention, its respect 
for sovereignty was reflected in the neutrality of such forces. The restrictions on the use of 
force to defence of peacekeepers or their equipment meant that the trinity of peacekeeping 
principles (consent, impartiality and non-use of force6) reflected the fundamental principles of 
                                                          
4
 3 5RZH µ0DLQWDLQLQJ 'LVFLSOLQH LQ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 3HDFH 6XSSRUW 2SHUDWLRQV 7KH /HJDO 4XDJPLUH IRU
0LOLWDU\&RQWLQJHQWV¶JCSL (2000) 45, 52. See also, Rowe (n.2), 227.  
5
 Rowe (n.2), 233. 
6
 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012 session, GAOR 66th session, supp. No. 19, 
para. 25. 
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international law of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force found in Article 2 of 
the UN Charter.7 
 
The fact that the UN General Assembly mandated the original force (UNEF I) is no 
coincidence8 in that its functions reflected the views of the Non Aligned majority, as well as 
traditional principles of international law that gave such states protection from intervention. 
However, peacekeeping subsequently crossed into the domain of the Security Council as part 
of its primary responsibility for peace and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter. This 
has led to the possibility of a more coercive peacekeeping force empowered, in whole or in 
part, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
The dialectic between consensual peacekeeping and its more belligerent variant was 
established as early as the second full peacekeeping force in the Congo in 1960±64 and was 
repeated, with less success, in the force in Somalia in 1993±5.9 It is currently back on the 
DJHQGDDVWKH81VWUXJJOHVWRLPSOHPHQWWKHµUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURWHFW¶10 µSURtection of 
FLYLOLDQVLQDUPHGFRQIOLFW¶11 DQGµKXPDQVHFXULW\¶DJHQGDV12 through, inter alia, µSURWHFWLRQ¶
mandates given to UN forces by the Security Council.13 These mandates typically authorise 
WKH81IRUFHXQGHU&KDSWHU9,,µWRXVHDOOQHFHVVDU\PHDQVWRFDUU\RXWLWVPDQGDWHZLWKLQ
LWVFDSDELOLWLHVDQGLWVDUHDVRIGHSOR\PHQW¶LQFOXGLQJµWRSURWHFWFLYLOLDQVXQGHULPPLQHQW
threat of physical violence¶14 
 
In general, the orthodoxy is that such mandates are compatible with the traditional principles 
of international law and peacekeeping15 and, therefore, do not constitute full-blown military 
enforcement action against a state on a par with the UN-authorised actions in Korea in 1950-3 
and the Gulf in 1991 (whose constitutional base is Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN 
                                                          
7
 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2012 session, GAOR 66th session, supp. No. 19, 
para. 25. 
8
 UNGA Res 998-1001 (1956). 
9
 UNSC Res 814 (1993), 897 (1994). 
10
 As formulated DWWKH81¶V:RUOG6XPPLW2XWFRPH'RFXPHQWRILQUNGA Res 60/1 (2005) paras 139-
9. 
11
 See, for example, UNSC Res 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians. 
12
 +XPDQVHFXULW\ZDV ILUVWSRVLWHG LQ WKH81'3¶V+XPDQ'HYHORSPHQW5HSRUW µ1HZ 'LPHQVLRQ LQ+XPan 
6HFXULW\¶81 
13
 N. ' :KLWH (PSRZHULQJ 3HDFH 2SHUDWLRQV WR 3URWHFW &LYLOLDQV )RUP RYHU 6XEVWDQFH¶  Journal of 
International Peacekeeping (2009) 327. 
14
 UNSC Res 1528 (2004) establishing UNOCI in the Ivory Coast. 
15
 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, ICJ Reports 1962, 163±4. 
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Charter).16 The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the end of the Cold War and a change in UN 
interventions, with operations in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia and 
Mozambique becoming multi-functional by combining peacekeeping with limited peace-
building. The latter was usually centred on the holding of elections as the pivotal event 
between conflict and a stable state. Such operations were a mixed success, with a number 
failing because the electoral process did not engage factions sufficiently to prevent a fresh 
outbreak of fighting (for instance, in Angola in the 1990s).17 Furthermore, these developments 
did not prevent the occurrence of egregious human rights violations under the noses of 
peacekeepers, most shockingly the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica.18 
 
More integrated extensive peace operations have emerged since the 2000 Brahimi Report.19 
Such operations combine peacekeeping with more ambitious peace-building; the latter 
consisting of much more than the crude introduction of Western-style democracy to an often 
alien environment. Given that such operations are often conducted in fragile or failed states, 
there has been a trend towards enabling the military element of such operations to use force 
beyond the traditional limited form of self-defence possessed by peacekeepers. 
 
The increasing complexity of peace operations that followed the recommendations of the 
2000 Brahimi Report has been described as a process of  µFLYLOLDQLVDWLRQ¶RISHDFHRSHUDWLRQV
ZKHUHE\WKHVWLOOODUJHPLOLWDU\SHDFHNHHSLQJFRPSRQHQWLVPDWFKHGE\WKHLQFOXVLRQRIµFLYLO
administration, humanitarian assistance, policing, electoral, human rights monitoring, 
HFRQRPLFUHYLYDOIXQFWLRQVDQGSHUVRQQHO¶20 In some ways this disguises the changes that 
have been wrought, at least at the level of the mandate, in the military element.  
 
Arguably, the developing nature and function of modern complex peace operations reflect 
changes in international law in which the prominence of external self-determination in the 
period of decolonisation and independence of new states has, to a large extent, been replaced 
                                                          
16
 UNSC Res 83 (1950); UNSC Res 678 (1990). 
17
 V. 3 )RUWQD µ8QLWHG 1DWLRQV $QJROD 9HULILFDWLRQ 0LVVLRQ¶ LQ : J. Durch (ed), The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping (Macmillan, 1994), 353. 
18
 See, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda, 15 Dec 1999 (UN doc S/1999/1257); Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution , The Fall of Srebrenica, 15 Nov 1999 (UN doc A/54/549).  
19
 µReport of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations¶81GRF$DQG6$XJXVW
(Brahimi Report). 
20
 J. Cockayne and D. 0DORQH µ8QLWHG 1DWLRQV 3HDFH 2SHUDWLRQV 7KHQ DQG 1RZ¶  International 
Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations (2005) 18. 
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by concerns for internal self-determination within existing states, while the protection and 
enhancement of human rights and human security (of individuals and groups) have 
supplemented the traditional concern for security between States. This has led to 21st century 
peace operations being furnished, as a matter of course, with Chapter VII elements in their 
mandates empowering them to protect the peace process and civilians under threat of attack, 
while still being based on the consent of the host State.  
 
The move towards greater coercion by UN peace operations has continued apace. Although 
they remain distinct from military enforcement action taken by Coalitions of the Willing 
(CoWs), this is often more in composition and command and control than in the mandates. 
The NATO-led IFOR and KFOR operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, although under UN 
mandates,21 operate under delegated command and control and, moreover, are equipped and, 
at least at their inception, were mandated to undertake potentially much deadlier levels of 
force than UN-commanded and controlled blue-helmeted forces.22 That distinction has 
become somewhat eroded. The NATO-led forces are authorised to operate against state and 
non-state actors alike,23 while UN operations generally operate against non-state actors 
(spoilers), those that threaten civilians and, exceptionally, organised rebel and insurgent 
armed groups.24 This means that although UN peace operations do not undertake peace 
enforcement against a state potentially in an international armed conflict, they may become 
engaged as combatants in a non-international armed conflict involving non-state actors.25 
 
Thus, increasingly coercive mandates would suggest that peacekeepers can cross the line to 
become war-fighters, RUµFRPEDWDQWV¶LQWKHODQJXDJHRIWKHODZVRIZDUIHL), sometimes 
causing confusion as to the legal status of peacekeepers, who are traditionally not seen as 
                                                          
21
 UNSC Res 1031 (1995) re IFOR in Bosnia; UNSC Res 1244 (1999) re KFOR in Kosovo. 
22
 See, for example, para. 9(a) of UN6&5HVZKLFKGHFLGHGWKDW.)25¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVLQFOXGHG
µGHWHUULQJ UHQHZHG KRVWLOLWLHV PDLQWDLQLQJ DQG ZKHUH QHFHVVDU\ HQIRUFLQJ D FHDVHILUH DQG HQVXULQJ WKH
withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary 
IRUFHV¶ 
23
 See, for example, para. 15 of UN6&5HVZKLFKDXWKRULVHG,)25WRµWDNHDOOQHFHVVDU\PHDVXUHV
to affect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-$RIWKHSHDFHDJUHHPHQW¶VWressed that 
µDOOSDUWLHVVKDOOEHKHOGHTXDOO\UHVSRQVLEOH IRUFRPSOLDQFHDQGVKDOOEHHTXDOO\VXEMHFW WRVXFKHQIRUFHPHQW
DFWLRQE\,)25DVPD\EHQHFHVVDU\WRHQVXUHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKDW$QQH[«¶ 
24
 See, for example, UNSC Res 1925 (2010), which established MONUSCO in the DR Congo (to replace 
MONUC), and emphasised the primary responsibility of the government for security, but stated that MONUSCO 
DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGLQWHUDOLDVHFXUHWKHµFRPSOHWLRQRIWKHRQJRLQJPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVLQWKH.LYXs and 
Orientale Province, resulting in minimizing the threat of armed groups and restoring security in sensitive areas 
«¶ 
25
 In either case there is enforcement action requiring the authority of the Security Council, see UNSC Res 1744 
(2007) re AU force (AMISOM) mandated to fight alongside government forces against al-Shabaab. 
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legitimate targets. Indeed, attacks on them remain prohibited under the 1994 UN Safety 
Convention.26 In 1999, the UN Secretary General attempted to clarify the non-combatant 
status of peacekeepers, even in situations of armed conflict, by declaring that they are to be 
viewed as civilians under IHL unless, and until, they actively engage as combatants in an 
armed conflict.27 
 
It is in this complex, constantly shifting and often dangerous environment that armed UN 
peacekeepers and police operate, with the potential to (mis)use lethal weapons.  
 
 
Widening of defensive use of force 
 
Over the lifetime of peacekeeping operations there has been confusion as to the nature and 
level of force that peacekeepers are permitted to use. Sitting somewhere between a military 
combat operation and an armed police operation,28 this confusion is unsurprising, even though 
the UN has had plenty of practice in which to develop clear norms on the use of force.  
 
At its core, the limited use of force available to peacekeepers means self-defence, which is 
normally interpreted narrowly to cover a peacekeeper using force in defence of his own life, 
KLVµFRPUDGHVDQGDQ\SHUVRQHQWUXVWHGLQ>KLV@FDUHDVZHOODVGHIHQGLQJ>KLV@SRVWFRQYR\
YHKLFOHRUULIOH¶29 Beyond this there has been a continuing lack of clarity as to whether the 
IRUFHFRXOGDOVRµGHIHQG¶that IRUFH¶VPDQGDWH 
 
While UNEF stuck to a narrow interpretation of self-defence by using light arms to defend 
itself, by 1960 there was an alternative version of peacekeeping in the Congo. ONUC used a 
variety of weapons: mortars, fighter and bomber aircraft, light armoured vehicles, as well as 
rifles, light automatic weapons and bayonets and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.30 ONUC 
initially confined its use of force to self-defence when overseeing the withdrawal of Belgian 
                                                          
26
 1994 UN Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Articles 7±9. 
27
 816*¶V %XOOHWLQ µ2EVHUYDQFH E\ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV )RUFHV RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +XPDQLWDULDQ /DZ¶, UN doc. 
ST/SGB/1999/13, 1999, section 1.2. On the difficulty of reconciling the Bulletin with the 1994 Convention see, 
Rowe (n.4), 52-3. 
28
 A position that has become even more acute with the end of the Cold War, see, M. Kaldor, New and Old 
Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford University Press, 1999), 125. 
29
 µ*HQHUDO*XLGHOLQHVIRU3HDFH-.HHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQV¶81'RF817&&* 
30
 G. I .A. ''UDSHUµ7KH/HJDO/LPLWDWLRQV8SRQWKH(PSOR\PHQWRI:HDSRQVE\Whe United Nations Force in 
WKH&RQJR¶ 12 (1963) ICLQ 396. 
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troops, but that proved inadequate when its task became the elimination of the mercenaries 
supporting the Katangese secession.31 In reality, in 1961, ONUC had ceased to act in a 
defensive way and began to take the initiative and enforce the peace by engaging the forces of 
non-state actors in combat.32 
 
This has also occurred in more recent operations; for example, in July 2012 MONUSCO used 
offensive force, including attack helicopters, against M23 rebels in DR Congo; and in April 
2011 UNOCI used attack helicopters against the heavy weapons of the forces of former 
President Laurent Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast. 
 
Despite a post-Cold War trend towards allowing more offensive action to be taken by 
peacekeepers, there remains reluctance, especially from TCNs, to move away from self-
defence as this makes the force less acceptable to the host state and the parties within it. Thus, 
narrow self-defence remains the norm for modern peacekeeping, even those peace operations 
having Chapter VII elements to their mandates, requiring them to protect the peace process 
and civilians.  
 
However, despite this reticence in practice, the UN has expanded the concept of self-defence 
at the doctrinal level. The Brahimi Report of 2000 did this by extending the language of self-
defence from individual self-defence to defence of the mission.33 This forms part of the 
doctrinal development of when legitimate force can be used by peacekeepers through the 
µJUDGXDOH[SDQVLRQof the meaning of self-defense in PKOs, from individual self-defense 
inherent to military personnel, to freedom of movement and defense of positions, to the 
GHIHQVHRIWKHPDQGDWHDQGWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKLUGSDUWLHV¶34 
 
This development is reflected in the 81¶VODWHVWVWDWHPHQWRIpeacekeeping doctrine in the 
2008 Principles and Guidelines document (sometimes known as the Capstone Document)² 
which, while still distinguishing peacekeeping from enforcement action, states that it is 
µwidely understood that peacekeeping forces may use force at the tactical level, with the 
                                                          
31
 UNSC Res 169 (1961). 
32
 UNSC Res 161 (1961). 
33
 Brahimi Report, para. 48±51. 
34
 N. 7VDJRXULDVµ&RQVHQW1HXWUDOLW\,PSDUWLDOLW\DQGWKH8VHRI)RUFHLQ3HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQV7KHLU
Constitutional 'LPHQVLRQ¶, 11 JCSL (2006), 465, 473. 
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authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate¶.35 
However, the reality is that once self-defence is so expanded it is no longer individual self-
defence but is a mandate permitting a certain level of enforcement (of measures of the type 
envisaged by Article 40 of Chapter VII), though short of full peace-enforcement under Article 
42 of Chapter VII. 
 
Thus, increasing pressure is on peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians under attack or 
under threat of attack and to protect the peace agreement and process from µspoilers¶ wishing 
to undermine it. With the greater use of weapons that this potentially entails, the problem 
becomes the choice as to which legal regime should be applicable to modern peace operations 
± that applicable in armed conflict (IHL) or international human rights law norms. 
 
 
Applicable Law:  
International Humanitarian Law or International Human Rights Law? 
 
Increasingly coercive mandates mean that peacekeepers can potentially cross the line to 
become µcombatants¶, in the language of the laws of war (IHL), sometimes causing confusion 
as to the legal status of peacekeepers who are traditionally not seen as legitimate targets.36 In 
1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in a piece of internal UN law, reasserted the civilian 
status of peacekeepers, even in situations of armed conflict, by declaring that they are to be 
viewed as civilians under IHL unless and until they actively engage as combatants in an 
armed conflict.37 This establishes the default position of a peacekeeper as a non-combatant, 
with him or her only becoming a combatant in exceptional circumstances.38 This should be 
                                                          
35
 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (UN, 2008), 31 (Capstone Document). 
36
 See judgment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and 
Augustine Gbao, (Case No. SCSL-04-15-A: Special Court for Sierra Leone (Appeals Chamber), 26 October 
2009, which was concerned with the criminality of attacks by RUF rebel forces against UNAMSIL in Sierra 
/HRQH)RUGLVFXVVLRQVHH-6ORDQµ3HDFHNHHSers under Fire: Prosecuting the RUF for Attacks Against the UN 
$VVLVWDQFH0LVVLRQIRU6LHUUD/HRQH¶Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2010) 243. 
37
 816*¶V%XOOHWLQµ2EVHUYDQFHE\8QLWHG1DWLRQV)RUFHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO+XPDQLWDULDQ/DZ¶VHFWLRQ 
38
 However, VHH3HWHU5RZH¶VSRLQW WKDW WKH%XOOHWLQ¶VDVVXPSWLRQ WKDW WKH81PD\EHFRPHDSDUW\ WRDQRQ-
international armed conflict does not accord with Article 2(2) of the 1994 Convention, under which 
SHDFHNHHSHUV UHPDLQ SURWHFWHG XQWLO WKH\ DUH µHQJDJHG DV FRPEDWDQWV DJDLQVW RUJDQL]HG DUPHG IRUFHV DQG WR
ZKLFK WKH ODZ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUPHG FRQIOLFW DSSOLHV¶, Rowe (n.4), 52. Thus, Rowe concludes that the 
µSURWHFWLRQRIWKH&RQYHQWLRQwould continue to apply to UN and associated personnel as long as they are 
not engaged in an international armed conflict as a Party to the conflict. Thus, even if they are, technically, 
parties to a non-international armed conflict the protection of the 1994 Convention would apply. The Secretary-
*HQHUDO¶V %XOOHWLQ KRZHYHU SURGXFHV D GLIIHUHQW UHVXOW ,W OHDGV WR WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW DOO FRPEDWDQWV LQ
whatever type of armed conflict, are equal in the eyes of international humanitarian law and that those who 
118 
 
contrasted with the legal status of US and other soldiers sent to fight against Iraqi forces in 
Kuwait, under a UN enforcement mandate,39 who were clearly instructed to engage the 
enemy,40 thereby recognising that they were lawful combatants and also legitimate targets in 
an armed conflict. 
 
IHL is applicable during an armed conflict, and thus is primarily applicable to the in bello, 
rather than the post bellum, stage (with the exception of the law of occupation). If, however, 
violence persists or flares up in the post-war phase and reaches the level of an armed conflict 
of a non-international character (defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia as protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups within a state),41 then IHL applies to the parties to that conflict and also to a UN 
peacekeeping operation should it engage, as a party to a conflict, against organised armed 
groups. Being based in the host state with the consent of that government signifies that a 
peacekeeping force would not become engaged against the forces of the host state in an 
international armed conflict. Indeed, if were to, the peacekeeping force would cease to be a 
peacekeeping operation and would become a non-consensual enforcement action requiring 
authorisation under Article 42 of the UN Charter. 
 
All this suggests that IHL does not play a significant role in a post-war situation to which 
peacekeepers are deployed and it is the jus post bellum, more accurately, those aspects of 
general international law, human rights law, refugee law and international criminal law, as 
well as the national criminal and military laws of the TCNs and national law of the host state, 
that together frame the work of a peace operation.  
 
This doctrinal position is reflected in practice. A review of a sample of current UN operations 
shows that peacekeepers will only exceptionally become engaged as a party in a non-
international armed conflict. An examination of documentation (UN force press briefings and 
other documents, as well as the Secretary General¶s reports and Security Council resolutions) 
of three different types of UN peacekeeping force over the last five years ± in Cyprus (a 
traditional force), in Liberia (in a dangerous but stable state) and in the DR Congo (where 
                                                                                                                                                                       
DWWDFN81IRUFHVKDYHDµULJKW¶WRGRVRSURYLGLQJWKH\DOVRFRPSO\ZLWKWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHVDQGUXOHVRI
WKDWODZ¶, Rowe (n.4), 53-4.      
39
 UNSC Res 678 (1990). 
40
 See, Pocket Card in A. Roberts and R.Guelff (eds.), Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford University Press, 
2000), 561. 
41
 3URVHFXWRUY7DGLü (1996) 105 ILR 488. 
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protracted armed violence regularly breaks out) ± reveals that while the force in Cyprus has 
not used any significant force in the last 5 years and the Liberian force has only used force in 
relatively narrow circumstances of self-defence and in dealing with riots, the Congo force has 
regularly used both defensive force to protect itself and civilians and, occasionally, alongside 
government forces, offensive force against armed groups who undermine the peace and 
threaten civilians.42 It is only in the latter situation, when fighting alongside government 
forces against organised armed groups, that the peacekeepers should be applying the laws of 
war. 
 
It follows that for most peacekeepers the relevant international laws will be those governing 
human rights. The existence of human rights obligations on peacekeepers flows from two 
main sources. The first source for peacekeepers is as state agents and comes from the human 
rights obligations of their sending states under human rights treaties,43 which attach to them, 
even when acting extra-territorially, in circumstances where they exercise control over areas 
or individuals. Although human rights jurisprudence is mixed, there is some indirect support, 
from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for making a further argument that 
when peacekeepers fire weapons at individuals they are, in effect, asserting jurisdiction over 
them for the purposes of human rights law.44 However, the orthodox view is that found in the 
General Comment of the Human Rights Committee in 2004 where it stated that parties to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must ensure the human rights of persons 
µwithin the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory 
«VXFKDVIRUFHVFRQVWLWXWLQJDQDWLRQDOFRQtingent of a State Party assigned to an 
international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation¶.45 
 
The second source of human rights obligation applies to peacekeepers as members of a UN 
IRUFHJLYHQWKH81¶VREOLJDWLRQVXQGHUFXVWRPDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOOaw that attach to it as an 
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 Data on file with the author, who would like to thank Auriane Botte, Ph.D student in the School of Law at the 
University of Nottingham, for painstakingly gathering this data. 
43
 Consider also the human rights obligations of the host states to ensure that human rights within its jurisdiction 
are protected, Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces, 234. 
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 L. Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2011), 19-21, 
citing cases where the state has been held to be in breach of the right to life when firing at a person from a 
distance; for example, Armando Alejandre Jr, Carlos Costa, Mario de la Pena and Pablo Morales v Cuba 
(Brothers to the Rescue case) Case 11.589, Report No 86/99, 29 September 1999, para. 25. But, see the 
European Court of Human Rights decision in Bankovic and others v 17 NATO States, Admissibility Decision 
(Grand Chamber), 12 December 2001, paras 52-3. 
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 +XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLWWHH*HQHUDO&RPPHQWµ1DWXUHRIWKH*HQHUDO/HJDO2EOLJDWLRQRQ6WDWHV3DUWLHVWR
WKH&RYHQDQW¶81'RF&&35&5HY$GG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international legal person.46 The International Law Commission (ILC) 2011 Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations clearly show that it is possible to attribute 
wrongful acts to the UN;47 such responsibility is based on it having duties under customary 
international law, including ones to uphold and protect human rights.  
 
 
The use of lethal force and the right to life 
 
Having established that human rights law is normally applicable to peacekeepers48and that 
even a more belligerent force will only occasionally become engaged as combatants, and so 
subject to humanitarian law, it would appear that modern peacekeepers are placed between 
the rock of human rights constraints and the hard place of a Security Council mandate that 
appears to require them to use lethal force in a range of circumstances.  
 
The fact that UN peacekeepers and armed police carry weapons, the use of which may cause 
deaths, seems at first glance to be incompatible with the right to life. When, if at all, is the 
taking of life by UN peacekeepers and police justified? Major human rights treaties make it 
clear that the right to life, though fundamental, is not absolute. The basic principle is that life 
cannot be taken arbitrarily.49 Louise Doswald-Beck suggests that in order to understand when 
life is not taken arbitrarily a good starting place is Article 2(2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which, in contrast to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, details when lethal force is permitted.  
 
Drawing on this, essentially, during peacetime and situations short of armed conflict, lethal 
force can only be used when absolutely necessary for self-defence (including defence of third 
parties), to effect an arrest or prevent escape of a detainee, or in action taken to quell a riot or 
insurrection; while during an armed conflict IHL applies to those engaged in it as combatants, 
when the right to life is further qualified, although civilians and those hors de combat remain 
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 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports 1949, 174-178; 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, ICJ Reports 1980, 73, 89-90. 
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 ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Articles 3-7, UN Doc A/66/10 
(2011); taken note of in UNGA Res 66/100 (2011). 
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 See further, N. ':KLWHµ8VHRI:HDSRQVLQ3HDFH2SHUDWLRQV¶LQ6WXDUW&DVH\-Maslen (ed.), Weapons 
under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014); D. 6WHSKHQVµ7KH/DZIXO8VHRI
)RUFHE\3HDFHNHHSLQJ)RUFHV7KH7DFWLFDO,PSHUDWLYH¶ 12 International Peacekeeping (2005) 163. 
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protected. This provides a relatively clear legal framework within which peacekeepers should 
operate. 
 
A more detailed examination of UN policy and guidelines on when peacekeepers can use 
force, including lethal force, shows that the UN largely acts within this legal framework, 
indeed, that the UN frames its policies and directives largely within the parameters of 
international human rights law, rather than IHL. For example, the Department of 
3HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQV¶Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping 
Operations of 2003 provides that self-defence includes the µright to protect oneself, other UN 
personnel, UN property and other persons under UN protection¶, though it does recognise that 
the Security Council can, exceptionally, authorise an operation to use armed force in 
situations other than self-defence, which might suggest going beyond the human rights 
standard. Beyond that the Handbook leaves it to the mission-specific Rules of Engagement 
(RoE) to µclarify the different levels of the use of force that can be used in various 
circumstances, how each level of force should be used and any authorizations that may need 
to be obtained from commanders¶.50 
 
RoE perform a mediatory role between the mandate and the actual use of force by 
peacekeepers. They µVSHFLI\WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQZKLFKDUPHGIRUFHPD\EHXVHGE\D
PLOLWDU\XQLWDQGLWVSHUPLVVLEOHH[WHQWDQGGHJUHH¶51 5R(µSURYLGHDVFOHDUO\DVSRVVLEOHWKH
parameters within which armed military personnel assigned to a peacekeeping operation may 
use fRUFH¶52 In this way, it has been argued that RoE are more important than the Security 
Council¶Vmandate in determining the actual level and extent of force used by a peacekeeping 
component.53 5R(DUHXVXDOO\QRWµUHJDUGHGDVOHJDOLQVWUXPHQWVLQWKHLURZQUight, but rather 
they reflect the law and thus are intended to ensure that military forces act within the law. The 
³ODZ´LQTXHVWLRQPD\FRPSULVHERWKQDWLRQDODQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶54 
 
(DFKPLVVLRQ¶V5R(JRYHUQWKHXVHRIIRUFHE\PLOLWDU\SHDFHNHHSHUVDQd Directives on the 
Use of Force (DUF) govern the use of force by any police contingent to the mission. Both are 
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 '3.2µ+DQGERRNRQ8QLWHG1DWLRQV0XOWLGLPHQVLRQDO3HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQV¶81 
51
 H. McCoubrey and N. D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations 
(Dartmouth, 1996), 146. 
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developed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. In 
2002, the UN produced draft RoE,55 though their current status is unclear. Oswald, Durham, 
and Bates assert that the µOHJDOIRXQGDWLRQIRU'8)LVSULPDULO\¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWV
ODZZKHUHDVWKHµOHJDOIUDPHZRUNIRU5R(LVDFRPELQDWLRQRI¶IHL and international human 
rights law.56 This analysis of the legal framework for the RoE of the peacekeeping component 
raises some concerns. The RoE of such forces should only reflect IHL if, and only to the 
extent that, they exceptionally become engaged as combatants within an armed conflict and, 
therefore, should normally be framed by LQWHUQDWLRQDOKXPDQULJKWVODZQRWDµPL[WXUH¶RIWKH
two. 
 
Although a systematic review of RoE is not possible, materials that reflect the RoE, such as 
VROGLHUV¶SRFNHWFDUGVWUDLQLQJPDWHULDOVVWDQGDUGVDQGUXOHV, all suggest that it is the case 
that RoE are largely framed by human rights law and, indeed, should be framed by such law 
and only exceptionally by the laws of war.57 Of course, if the mandate is for military 
enforcement action wherein the force will be engaged as combatants in an armed conflict, 
then the framework for the RoE will largely be the laws of war,58 although it must not be 
forgotten that human rights law continues to apply during armed conflict. 
 
As mentioned above, the 2008 Capstone Document expands somewhat on when potentially 
lethal force may be used, stating that peacekeeping operations may µuse force at the tactical 
level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of 
the mandate¶. Again, the latter seems open-ended, but the Capstone Document goes on to 
H[SODLQWKDWµDll necessary means¶, which would include lethal force where necessary, may be 
used against µmilitias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine 
the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population¶ in order to µdeter forceful 
attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order¶.59 
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It is possible to interpret these guidelines as being compatible with human rights standards if 
the provisions recognising that potentially lethal force may be used when absolutely necessary 
to effect an arrest or in tackling riots and insurrections is applied to include these, and 
analogous, situations faced by peacekeepers when force is absolutely necessary to tackle 
militias, criminal gangs and other armed spoilers who undermine the peace or threaten 
civilians. If this purposive interpretation is adopted, then it follows that there is sufficient 
leeway in human rights law to enable peacekeepers to perform their functions using 
potentially lethal force where absolutely necessary. 
 
There remains the problem of ensuring that peacekeepers do not exceed these standards under 
the guise of a Chapter VII mandate that authorises µQHFHVVDU\PHDVXUHV¶IRUQHFHVVDU\
measures in a situation short of armed conflict are those absolutely necessary to defend 
civilians or to defend peacekeepers when tackling those who undermine the peace.60 There 
also remains the problem, found in many UN documents, of peacekeepers being permitted to 
use deadly force to protect UN property, which is generally difficult to reconcile with human 
rights law,61 although it is permissible in some circumstances under IHL. 
 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states that obligations derived from the Charter prevail 
over those in any other international treaty, does not affect the analysis given above for a 
number of reasons, two of which will be mentioned. First, Article 103 does not affect 
customary obligations under human rights law and protecting the right to life is one of those. 
Second, Security Council obligations cannot override human rights treaty obligations unless 
the Security Council expressly states that this is the case. Drawing upon the European Court 
of Human Rights judgment in the case Al-Jedda of 2011, it is for TCNs to interpret Security 
Council mandates to peacekeepers to use necessary measures in line with their human rights 
                                                          
60/DEHOOHGµDFWLYH¶VHOI-defence by McLaughlin (n.3), 410. 
61
 It may be possible, in certain limited circumstances, to reconcile defence of property with human rights law if, 
for example, lethal force is used to prevent insurgents acquiring and using UN weapons against peacekeepers or 
civilians ± K. M. Larsen, Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers (Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 376-7, 379-80. See further, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions 
ZKRVWDWHGWKDWµSURWHFWLRQRISURSHUW\FDQQRWEHLQYRNHGDVDMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKe use of potentially lethal force 
XQOHVV LW LV VRPHKRZ OLQNHG WR WKH GHIHQFH RI OLIH¶ 5HSRUW RI WKH 6SHFLDO 5DSSRUWHXU DQQH[HG WR 81 GRF
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obligations unless, and until, the Security Council clearly exempts states from these 
obligations.62 
 
 
Positive obligations to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of life 
 
The argument so far has been that while human rights law allows peacekeepers to use lethal 
force where absolutely necessary and proportionate in self-defence, defence of third parties 
and to deal with armed spoilers, they cannot go beyond that by adopting some of the more 
generous rules of IHL unless, and until, they become engaged as combatants in an armed 
conflict. There is no half way house between human rights law and IHL and this should be 
borne in mind by the Security Council, the Secretary General and the UNDPKO when 
mandating, assembling and directing the activities of a peacekeeping force.   
 
7KH81¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIZKHQSHDFHNHHSHUVFDQXVHIRUFHVHHPVWRDFFRUGZLWKVRPH
exceptions, with the obligation on TCNs and the UN not to take life arbitrarily, but pressure 
will increase on peacekeepers to use lethal force more extensively. Thus, care must be taken 
to ensure that policies and guidelines do not broaden the circumstances of when force can be 
used beyond the frameworks provided by international law.  
 
Furthermore, as the Human Rights Committee points out, the obligation on states, and by 
analogy the UN, is not only to ensure that their agents do not arbitrarily take life, but also to 
take positive measures to protect that right.63 Those positive obligations, drawn from treaty 
body practice on both law enforcement and military activities, are: first, the presence of clear 
ODZVSURKLELWLQJWKHµDUELWUDU\XVHRISRWHQWLDOO\OHWKDOIRUFH¶VHFRQGDGHTXDWHWUDLQLQJRI
military, security, and police personnel to ensure they respect the law; third, adequate 
planning of any peace operation to prevent arbitrary loss of life as much as possible;64 and, 
finally, provision for independent investigation and, if necessary, criminal prosecution of 
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violators.65 Access to justice for victims should also be included in the last obligation, 
including non-judicial avenues of redress. 
 
/RRNLQJDWWKH81¶VGRFWULQHDQGSUDFWLFHLQWKLVUHJDUGWKHUHDUHDQXPEHURIGHILFLHQFLHV
that will be pointed out. 
 
 
Whether there is UN law governing when lethal force may be used by peace operations? 
 
While there are a number of UN documents (more for UN police than for peacekeepers) 
specifying when lethal force can be used, they are primarily concerned with redefining the 
notion of self-defence. The detail is left to RoE for the military component of peace 
operations and DUF for the police element, arguably leaving a gap in which the UN should 
provide more precise, but generally applicable, regulations on when lethal force can be used. 
The key document is the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials,66 which is viewed in the UN system as normative.67 Although it may 
well have become custom, its terms are limited to police enforcement. While some of its 
principles are also applicable to peacekeepers, there is a need for an equivalent document for 
UN peacekeepers. This document should still be based on human rights law, but should 
clarify when lethal force can be used against spoilers and other armed groups. It should also 
clDULI\WKH81¶VSRVLWLRQRQSURWHFWLRQRI81SURSHUW\ZKLFKLVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKKXPDQ
rights standards.68 
 
 
Whether there is adequate training of personnel in respect for the law? 
 
Analysis of UN documents on training reveals that, for peacekeepers, the responsibility to 
ensure that soldiers are properly trained, presumably including basic weapons training, falls 
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on member states, though the Secretary General is requested to prepare training materials to 
assist those states in this regard.69 
 
The development of training materials at UN level and ensuring that TCNs use them are both 
essential if the UN is to reduce the unevenness of training within TCNs, where it can be 
envisaged that, left to their own devices, there will be contingents with little or no training, a 
number that are well trained in IHL, but not in human rights law, and others that have 
comprehensive training programmes. 
 
Pre-Deployment Training Standards are, since 2007, now being produced by the UNDKO. 
However, they are not encouraging when considered against the applicable laws that have 
been LGHQWLILHGWKXVIDU)RUH[DPSOHWKHµ+XPDQ5LJKWV6WDQGDUGLQWKH8VHRI)RUFH¶, 
SURGXFHGLQGRHVQRWFRQWDLQDµVWDQGDUG¶DVVXFK, but simply states that the training 
PRGXOHRQWKLVLVVXHZLOOµSURYLGHSDUWLFLSDQWVZLWKDFOHDUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHKXPDQULJKWV
LPSOLFDWLRQVUHODWLQJWRWKHXVHRIIRUFHDQGILUHDUPVE\ODZHQIRUFHPHQWRIILFLDOV¶70 
 
Even more worryingly, LQWKH'3.2SURGXFHGWKHµ813URWHFWLRQRf Civilian PDT 
6WDQGDUGV¶that, on the one hand, restate the rules on self-defence that have been identified 
since 1956 and, on the other, then go much further than this when contemplating mandates 
with Chapter VII elements. The document provides that all UN peacekeepers have an inherent 
right to defend themselves by using force, up to and including deadly force if necessary. In 
addition, SHDFHNHHSHUVDXWKRULVHGXQGHU&KDSWHU9,,FDQXVHVXFKIRUFHµWRSUHYHQWSUH-
empt, and respond effectively to acts of, or imminent threat, of violence against civilians from 
DQ\VRXUFHLQFOXGLQJKRVWVWDWHERGLHVRUDXWKRULWLHV¶71 
 
$VDµVWDQGDUG¶WKLVOHDYHVDJUHDWGHDOWREHGHVLUHGSRWHQWLDOO\HQFRXUDJLQJEURDG
interpretations of when deadly force can be used and when weapons can be fired, for instance 
µSUH-HPSWLYHO\¶)XUWKHUPRUHWKRXJKLWLVWUXHWRVD\WKDWWKHLPSDUWLDOHQIRUFHPHQWRID
protection mandate should not distinguish between state and non-state actors who threaten 
civilians, the fact is that action against the government will constitute enforcement action 
rather than peacekeeping. 
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Whether there is adequate planning of peace operations in terms of mandate, size and 
equipment (including weapons) to limit to the greatest degree loss of life (including the lives 
of UN peacekeepers, UN police and civilians)? 
 
Training, no matter how comprehensive, will only be effective if there has been adequate 
planning so that the force deployed is capable of meeting the exigencies of the situation and 
environment it is deployed to. This is recognised by the 2008 Capstone Document: 
 
The Secretariat has a responsibility to provide the Security Council with an 
accurate assessment of the risks associated with its decision to deploy a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation, and ensure that its mandate and capabilities are 
tailored to the requirements of the situation72 
 
However, the realities of putting a peace operation together often result in peace operations 
that are, at least initially, inadequate for the task. An examination of the UN Secretary 
General¶VLQLWLDOUHSRUWVWRWKH81 Security Council, advising on the nature and extent of the 
operation for a particular situation, often reveals this as he struggles to put in place a force 
that is sufficient in size and adequately equipped and supported. 
 
The reality is that in the deployment period up to full complement, the greatest danger is to 
civilians and to the peace process, not from the arbitrary use of force by UN personnel, but 
from on-going violence committed by non-state actors. 
 
 
Whether there is automatic investigation into when life is arbitrarily taken by a UN 
peacekeeper and provision for access to justice for victims? 
 
Arguably, even in the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict, independent investigation 
of uses of lethal force by UN peacekeepers or police, as well as when the lives of UN 
personnel are themselves lost, is required. In conditions short of armed conflict such 
investigation is clearly required under human rights law. Within the UN system, this function 
is performed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),73 though its µ,QYHVWLJDWLRQV
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0DQXDO¶RI74 PDNHVLWFOHDUWKDWHDFK7&1KDVµVRYHUHLJQULJKWVDQGSULPDU\
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶WRLQYHVWLJDWHDOOHJDWLRQVRIPLVFRQGXFWby its military personnel. 
Nevertheless, OIOS investigators may play a role if the TCN so requests, or if the TCN has 
failed to respond to a complaint, but such an investigation is subject to the national and 
military law of the TCN.75 
 
In terms of access to justice for victims, there are a number of UN laws and practices 
providing remedies, though they tend not to be specifically human rights focused, yet the 
reality is that many abuses will go unpunished and victims will remain without redress. The 
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which grants the 
UN and its agents legal immunities, still requires that the UN µshall make provisions for 
appropriate modes of settlement¶ for contractual disputes or disputes of a private law 
character to which the UN is a party (in Article VIII, section 29). The 1990 model UN SOFA 
provides for the establishment of a standing claims commission for disputes or claims of a 
private law character,76 though in practice such commissions have not been created and 
claims have been settled through internal claims review boards.77 Furthermore, there has been 
considerable practice by the UN, dating back to the first forces in 1956 and 1960, by which 
the UN has paid compensation to injured third parties.78 None of these, however, provide for a 
systematic system of access to justice for victims of human rights violation at the hands of 
UN peacekeepers or police. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout the history of peacekeeping, there has been a gap between the mandates agreed at 
the political level in the UN ± in the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat ± 
and the actions of peacekeepers on the ground. One only has to go back to Bosnia, during the 
dark days of UNPROFOR, when Chapter VII resolutions spoke of safe areas protected by 
UNPROFOR contingents that were wholly inadequate in military terms; or back to the mid-
                                                          
74
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1970s when SG Waldheim stated that peacekeepers could use force to protect their mandate at 
a time when they were clearly restricted to a narrow concept of self-defence. 
 
While the Security Council may feel that it has discharged its primary responsibility for peace 
and security by introducing Chapter VII into modern peace operations, it leaves the situation 
on the ground unclear.79 Peacekeepers are required to use lethal force to protect civilians and 
the peace process. However, this chapter has argued that, in so doing, they are primarily 
bound by the principles of human rights law,  and principles of IHL are the exception.80 
 
:KLOHLWLVSRVVLEOHWRUHFRQFLOHWKHµSURWHFWLRQPDQGDWHV¶JLYHQWRPRGHUQSHDFHoperations 
with the restrictions on the arbitrary deprivation of life contained in human rights law, care 
must be taken, as mandates produced by the Security Council increase pressure on 
peacekeepers and TCNs, not to stray into a legal no-PDQ¶VODQGEHWZHHn human rights law 
and humanitarian law.  In this zone individuals would have neither clear rights under human 
rights law nor protection under the laws of war, meaning that the use of lethal force is 
unaccountable and open to abuse. 
 
Any arguments for a middle ground between human rights law and the laws of war would 
have to be based on a conceptualisation of a jus post bellum, which might claim that a special 
regime for the use of force is necessary to secure the peace in a post-conflict, but still violent 
and volatile, situation.81 As yet, no such sustained arguments have been made and, even when 
they are, it will require a further process of international negotiation and law-making to 
elaborate such standards. This author would argue against any underlying justification for 
such a development given that human rights laws, especially non-derogable ones, such as the 
right to life,82 were framed precisely with violent situations in mind. Furthermore, human 
rights law is sufficiently flexible to allow peacekeepers to do their jobs within the strictures of 
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the law. It is not human rights law that prevents peacekeepers fulfilling their functions, rather 
it is often a lack of military capability. Of course, there is great concern that peacekeepers use 
force when necessary to protect civilians under existential threat, but care must be taken to 
ensure that while more is done to achieve this laudable aim, the excessive use of force by 
peacekeepers, which may itself leads to the arbitrary deprivation of life, is not encouraged.  
